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abstract

palavras-chave

This article examines political subjectivities, community engagements and voting
practices among residents of São Paulo’s Zona Sul peripheries in the three years preceding Brazil’s 2018 presidential election. Building on a 398-person household survey, 46
in-depth interviews, and extensive participation observation over the course of a fouryear study, we argue that although most residents of our study communities across the
political spectrum are disenchanted with institutional politics, many maintain political
engagement through their everyday lives, including activism centered on intersectional identities and state-sponsored violence/genocide. Our discussion combines statistical analysis and auto-ethnographic inflected vignettes and is in dialogue with two
common themes present in recent analyses of the Brazilian political landscape: the role
of urban periphery voters in the election of Bolsonaro, and the complex connections between moralities and political subjectivities. In conclusion, we reflect on opportunities
and challenges for progressive political engagement in the (post)Bolsonaro era.
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2018 Election.

Entre “nós” e “eles”:
subjetividades políticas nas sombras das eleições brasileiras de 2018
resumo
O artigo examina subjetividades políticas, engajamento e voto entre moradores da periferia da zona sul de São Paulo, nos três anos
que antecederam a eleição presidencial de 2018. Com base em pesquisa domiciliar com 398 pessoas, 46 entrevistas em profundidade e uma extensa
observação participante por quatro anos, argumentamos que, embora a maioria dos residentes dessa região estejam desencantados com a política
institucional, muitos mantém um engajamento político no cotidiano, incluindo ativismo identitário e lutas contra a violência protagonizada pelo Estado. Nossa discussão combina análise estatística e vinhetas autoetnográficas e está em diálogo com dois temas comuns presentes em análises recentes
do cenário político brasileiro: o papel dos eleitores da periferia na eleição de Bolsonaro e as complexas conexões entre moralidades e subjetividades
políticas. Concluindo, refletimos sobre os desafios para o engajamento político progressista na era (pós) Bolsonaro.
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introduction
Since the election of Jair Bolsonaro as Brazil’s president on October 28, 2018, social
scientists, political pundits and journalists have offered a barrage of explanations for
a result that seemed unimaginable only a few months earlier. For many, Bolsonaro’s
victory represents the latest in a growing wave of far right, neo-populism across the
globe (Estadão Conteúdo, 2018; Estadão Conteúdo, 2019; Mota, 2020). Others see the
election as not so much an affirmation of Bolsonarism, but the implosion of Brazil’s
mainstream center-right political parties and the nail in the coffin to a well-orchestrated anti-Partido dos Trabalhadores/PT (Workers Party) movement (Almeida,
2019). Many commentators, including the authors of this article, further wonder
why so many “previously poor” (Klein, Junge, & Mitchell, 2018), working class, and
lower middle class Brazilians voted for a candidate whose interests would appear to
align more closely with elite and upper middle class Brazilians (Carta Capital, 2018).
Or, turning this question on its head, why did so many previously poor Brazilians
stop supporting the PT, whose policies played a significant role in improving their
material conditions and creating new life possibilities?
In this article, we focus our attention on voting practices, political subjectivities, and community engagements among the previously poor in São Paulo’s
Zona Sul peripheries in the three years preceding the 2018 presidential election1.
Our analysis centers on data from the São Paulo site (Project MOVI) of a four-year
collaborative study on socioeconomic mobility and class subjectivities among the
previously poor in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Recife2. We begin with an overview
of the Zona Sul. Next, we present quantitative findings on political attitudes, voting patterns and community/political engagement in our four study communities,
and highlight variation across sociodemographic categories. We then use a series
of auto-ethnographic inflected vignettes to explore political discourse and practice
in action, before concluding with a brief consideration of what these data suggest
regarding the future of Brazilian politics and urban-based political movements.
Our discussion is structured in dialogue with two themes that are present in
many analyses of the 2018 election. The first is the extent to which urban periphery
voters bear responsibility for Bolsonaro’s election. Our project data and electoral
results reveal a complicated picture, with lower support for Bolsonaro in the Zona
Sul than in other regions of the city, sizable numbers of blank and null ballots, and
high levels of disenchantment with the PT. We believe these findings reflect the
alienation of many voters from traditional political parties and institutional forms of
politics, but not necessarily political disengagement or a widespread entrenchment
of extreme-right political views, as we will explore in more detail below. The second
theme centers on the interconnections between moralities and political subjectivities in São Paulo urban peripheries. If, as many authors have shown, there has been
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1 | We would like to thank
our Project MOVI team and
everyone in the Zona Sul
who opened up their lives
to us and whose generosity
made our project possible.
2 | “Social Mobility, Poverty
Reduction, and Democracy in
an Emerging Middle Class,”
National Science Foundation,
Division of Behavioral and
Cognitive Sciences, Cultural
Anthropology Program; Award
Number 1534621 for the São
Paulo component under
Principal Investigator Klein.
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an intensification of “conservative” morality in Brazil in urban periphery communities in recent years (Feltran, 2017; Pinheiro-Machado, 2016), our data demonstrate
that many Zona Sul progressive movements centered on race, gender, sexuality, and
anti-violence/anti-genocide are similarly expressed in moral terms (Moutinho, 2012,
2014), though a morality quite different than Bolsonarism and other forms of social
and political conservatism. Our three sets of ethnographic vignettes explore how
São Paulo’s peripheries are spaces of intense political and moral conflict that produce both individual subjectivities and the social topography of urban peripheries
(Lefebvre, 1991). Our analysis is guided by an “anthropology of becoming” framework
that recognizes that people “belong simultaneously to multiple systems that themselves are made up of people, things, and forces with varying degrees of agentive
capacity” and “inhabit multiple temporalities at once” (Biehl & Locke, 2017:5-6). In
examining these unresolved and opened-ended processes, we seek to expose factures, or to use Tsing’s (2011) terminology, zones of friction, through which urban
periphery negotiate the uneven terrain of Brazil’s sociopolitical landscapes, and, for
some, develop new forms of progressive political engagement.
Methods
In 2015, the United States’ National Science Foundation awarded co-author Klein
and two other North American anthropologists a multi-year collaborative grant
to examine “Social Mobility, Poverty Reduction, and Democracy in an Emerging
Middle Class” in three Brazilian cities – Recife (Benjamin Junge), Rio de Janeiro (Sean
Mitchell), and São Paulo (Klein). As is evident in our original project title, when we
conceived the study in 2013, Brazil was in the midst of an extended period of economic growth and international acclaim as one of the BRICS economies. By the time
we began data collection in July 2016, the country was, in stark contrast, experiencing
a severe recession and significant political upheaval. These developments caused
us to shift our conceptual framework away from the “new middle class” per se to
broader questions of lifeways, economic precarity, and political subjectivities among
popular class Brazilians.
Our three-city project used a mixed-methods, ethnographic-grounded approach based in neighborhoods that experienced significant socioeconomic change
over the past 15 years (Klein, Junge, & Mitchell, 2018). Building on PI Klein’s prior
research experience, the São Paulo site decided to focus on four neighborhoods
in the Zona Sul peripheries – Jardim Nakamura/Jardim Ângela, Parque Regina/
Campo Limpo, Parque Santo Antônio/Jardim São Luis, and Grajaú. After assembling
and training a 15-person research team, from July to September 2016 we applied a
systematic cluster sampling methodology3 to implement a quantitative household
survey in these four communities. Our approximately 45-minute long instrument
Rev. antropol. (São Paulo, Online) | v. 63 n. 2: e160722 | USP, 2020

3 | For each of our four São
Paulo research sites, we
used census data to identify
ten contiguous census
tracts that had experienced
socioeconomic mobility
during the PT years. We
then randomly selected
streets within each census
tract and approached every
fifth house to identify adult
respondents to complete the
survey, which we administered
via a tablet computer. We
recruited participants at
different times (i.e., weekdays
from late morning to early
afternoon, weekdays from late
afternoon to early evening,
and weekends) to capture the
broadest possible sample.
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addressed respondents’ household characteristics; work history, sources of income,
and consumption patterns; household educational trajectories; leisure activities
and travel; class subjectivities and experiences of socioeconomic mobility; political
engagement; and opinions on contemporary political issues and the quality of life
in their neighborhoods. During the second year of the project (July – November
2017), co-authors Carmo and Klein and a third team member conducted in-depth,
semi-structured interviews with 41 individuals identified through snowball sampling building on our insertion in our project communities, with Klein conducting
an additional five interviews in project year three (August 2018). These conversations ranged from 35 minutes to two hours and addressed household composition;
everyday routine and life accomplishments; neighborhood characteristics, class
subjectivities and socioeconomic mobility; political opinions and political/community engagement; aspirations for the future; and a mapping activity to identify
urban mobility patterns. Throughout the project, Carmo and Klein also conducted
extensive participant observation, with particular emphasis on examining interlocutors’ social networks, interviews with community activists, and two photo voice
focus groups (one with residents of Capão Redondo, and one with members of our
research team) in which participants discussed their own digital images of social
exclusion and inclusion in São Paulo.
It is important to highlight that nearly all of our São Paulo research team are
from the Zona Sul and have similar socioeconomic profiles (i.e. Class C to Class D,
with a few in Class B3) and life experiences to those of our broader study population.
In addition, all have histories of political engagement in the Zona Sul, including
participating in Black, Black feminist, anti-violence, neighborhood, environmental,
and youth empowerment collectives and social movements. We recognize that the
co-authors’ personal characteristics – two graduate students at the Universidade
de São Paulo, one an Afro-descendant feminist activist from Jardim Nakamura, the
other a white, working-class social justice activist from greater São Paulo, and a gay,
applied anthropology professor raised in suburban southern California – no doubt
shaped our ethnographic insertions and interactions with our interlocutors. We embrace these distinct perspectives and believe our collaborative, auto-ethnographic
approach (Ulysse, 2007) provides insights that would not be possible through a
single researcher study.
the zona sul and our study communities
São Paulo’s Zona Sul4 peripheries are home to more than 1.9 million individuals and
make up nearly 40% of the city’s physical space. As an extensive literature by critical
urban theorists demonstrates (Bonduki & Rolnik, 1982; Kowarick, 2000; Kowarick
& Frúgoli, Jr., 2016; Rolnik, 2011), São Paulo’s spatial expansion has occurred in an
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4 | n this article, we define the
Zona Sul as consisting of the
four southern administrative
districts (Subprefeituras)
beyond the Rio Pinheiros
(Pinheiros River) – Campo
Limpo, M’Boi Mirim, Capelo
de Socorro, and Parelheiros.
This demarcation mirrors
popular understandings
of the city’s socio-spatial
landscape, as captured in the
Zona Sul-based Racionais MCs
classic 2002 rap Da Ponte Pra
Cá (From the Bridge over here),
with the Zona Sul on one side
and the Center on the other.
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uneven manner in which wealth has concentrated in central regions with modernist
architecture, high levels of infrastructure and mostly high-density residential areas,
and concentric rings of increasingly poorer neighborhoods surrounding this still-expanding center. In these on-going urban transformations, the Zona Sul is perhaps
the city’s most dynamic and heterogeneous region, with neighborhoods ranging
from luxury condominium complexes (e.g. Vila Andrade), favelas and occupations
in the region’s outer zones, and significant – if increasingly economically precarious – lower middle and working class populations in its more inner regions (Klein,
2019; Magnani, 1998; Marques, 2014). The Zona Sul peripheries also have among the
highest levels of social vulnerability in the city (CEM, n.d.), with one-third of households living below the poverty line. But at ground level, Zona Sul neighborhoods
exhibit marked internal variation, as can be seen in our study communities. In each,
pronounced socioeconomic difference is frequently visible on any given block, with
some houses larger than others, condominiums next to self-constructed homes, and
favelas alongside consolidated areas with high levels of infrastructure.
Another central characteristic of the Zona Sul is its concertation of Afrodescendant Brazilians. According to 2010 census data, pretas and pardas5 represent
56% of the population of the M’Boi Mirim district (which includes our Jardim São
Luis and Jardim Nakamura project neighborhoods), and 49% in the Campo Limpo
district (which includes our Parque Regina project neighborhood), making these
respectively the second and ninth most Afro-Brazilian of São Paulo’s 32 administrative districts (Prefeitura Municipal de São Paulo, 2018). In contrast, only 8% of the
population in the nearby yet “other side of the bridge” Vila Mariana district is preta or
parda. These data highlight São Paulo’s marked racial segregation. During the 1990s,
three Zona Sul districts – Capão Redondo, Jardim Ângela, and Jardim São Luis — also
received the moniker “the triangle of death,” and as community residents still point
out today, the United Nations once designated the region the most violent in the
world. And after a decrease in homicides in the 2000 and early 2010s, there has been
a significant increase in murder rates in recent years, with an estimated 25% of the
killings being committed by the military police (G1, 2019).
Like other São Paulo urban peripheries, our project communities have long
histories of political organization around the conditions of everyday life (Holston,
2009; Silva, 2017). These social movements have complex and shifting patterns of
interconnection with churches, non-governmental organizations, political parties,
and the State. During the past decade, there has also been the emergence of a new
wave of political organizing through collectives (coletivos) focused on intersectional identities. For example, Grajaú’s Cia Teatro de Humbalada modified the social
landscape of the region through bringing together “women, fags (bichas), monsters,
savages (povos da mata), mothers and Blacks doing theater” in a “center (ponto) of cultural resistance in the periphery” (Cia Humbalada de Teatro, 2017). Such articulation
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5 | The Brazilian census has five
official racial/color categories:
preta (black), parda (brown/
mixed Black and white), branca
(white), indigena (indigenous),
e amerela (yellow/Asian).
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of and mobilization around gender, race and sexuality subjectivities in the Zona Sul
additionally occurs through saraus (e.g., the renowned Cooperifa in Jardim São Luis)
and thriving hip hop and graffiti movements (Bertelli & Feltran, 2017; Caldeira, 2012;
Pardue, 2010; Vaz, 2008). Each of these movements, in its own way, uses artistic production to denounce the harsh conditions of life in the urban peripheries, reinforce
positive periphery-grounded identities, and support new political subjectivities and
practices at the margins of political parties, electoral politics, and governmental
institutions (Bertelli & Feltran, 2017; Carmo, 2017; D’Andrea, 2013; Klein, 2019).
political practices and attitudes in the zona sul:
findings from the 2016 project movi household survey
During the 2018 presidential election, Jair Bolsonaro solidly defeated former São
Paulo mayor and PT candidate Fernando Haddad in both the first round (46.0% to
29.3%) and the October runoff (55.1% to 44.9%) (G1 2018). Haddad fared particularly
poorly in the city of São Paulo, where he received only 19.7% of votes in the first round
and 39% in the runoff. However, a closer look at election results in the Zona Sul reveal
less support for Bolsonaro than in the city as a whole. In first round voting, Bolsonaro
did not receive more than 40% in any of the four electoral districts (Campo Limpo,
Jardim São Luis, Piraporinha, and Grajaú) in which our project neighborhoods are situated. And while first round support for Haddad in these districts only ranged from
25% in Campo Limpo to 32% in Grajaú, another 13% to 15% in each district voted for
Ciro Gomes, suggesting that a sizable subset of the Zona Sul periphery may have
center-left/left leanings. Then, in the runoff, two of our project electoral districts,
Campo Limpo and Jardim São Luis, narrowly supported Bolsonaro (53.2% to 46.8%
and 51.6% to 48.4%, respectively), while Piraporinha and Grajaú went strongly for
Haddad (57.4% to 42.6% and 56.9% to 43.1%, respectively), with approximately 16%
turning in blank or null ballots across the four districts. In this section, we present
findings from our 2016 quantitative household survey to situate our ethnographic
vignettes and provide a window into the complex political subjectivities at play in
Bolsonaro’s election.
The Sample
398 respondents completed our survey instrument over the period July – September,
2016. Respondents ranged in age from 18 to 88 (mean = 41.3) with 54.7% female, 45.0%
male, and .3% transgender. Using the five Brazilian census race/categories, 41.6%
of the sample self-identified as parda/brown (41.6%), 30.2%, branca/white) (30.2%)
and preta/black (26.5%). In terms of education, 51.1% had not completed high school,
35.2% were high school graduates, and 14.1% had some college education. Fifty-eight
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percent of respondents had worked in the past 30 days, with 42.7% employed in the
private sector, 48.9% self-employed, autonomous or small businesspeople, and
6.1% public sector employees. Average monthly household income ranged from 0 to
R$13,000 (mean = R$2,807, median = R$2,450), with “Class C” (53.1%), “working class”
(45.6%), and ‘Class D” (31%) the most common class self-identification categories6.
Regarding religious affiliation, 53.4% described themselves as Catholic, and 29.7%
evangelical (17.2% Pentecostal and 12.5% non-Pentecostal). Most respondents also
regularly use social media (75% were on WhatsApp in the past 30 days, and 64% on
Facebook), and 39% had a member of their household who had traveled domestically by airplane since 2003.
Political Attitudes and Practice
Our survey instrument included sections addressing respondent’s political attitudes and practice, including Likert-scale items on overall interest in politics
(1 question), degree of conflict in society (6 questions), the Brazilian political
system and PT governance (10 questions), gender relations (9 questions), race
relations (6 questions), and opinions on 13 contemporary social movements7,
as well as open- and closed-ended questions on engagement with community/
political organizations, voting in the 2014 presidential election, and participation
in street protests since 2013. Our goal in presenting an overview of these data is
not to develop or support typologies of “the periphery political subjectivity” or
subsets thereof, but rather to draw attention to the breadth and complexities of
the Zona Sul political landscape.
Our sample as a whole demonstrated low levels of engagement with institutionalized forms of politics. In response to the question “to what extent are you interested in political topics today”, the mean response on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = “no interest at
all” and 5 = “a great deal of interest) was 1.8, with interest in politics increasing with
education level (less than high school education = 1.64, high school education = 2.06,
some college = 2.5, p = 001). Less than 1% of respondents reported participation in a
political party, institution council, or labor union in the past 12 months (the highest
level of community/political engagement was with “religious institutions” at 4.2%).
On the other hand, 9% reported participating in a political demonstration since
2013. This alienation from institutional politics was mirrored in consecutive 1 to 5
Likert scale questions on whether respondents felt represented by the Lula, Dilma
and Temer administrations, with participants moving from a neutral assessment
(2.98) on the Lula administrations to 2.38 for the Dilma-led PT governments to only
1.71 for the then governing center-right Temer administration. Along a similar vein,
respondents were neutral (3.00) on whether “the PT improved the lives of people
like you” and only 13% identified the PT as a political party that they “supported or
Rev. antropol. (São Paulo, Online) | v. 63 n. 2: e160722 | USP, 2020
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6 | The next most common
class self-identifications were
12.5% “lower middle class”,
12.2% “middle class”, 10%
“class E” and 9.2% “poor”. The
survey used “select all that
apply” questions that asked
respondents if they considered
themselves to be within a
list of commonly used class
categories. The first consisted
of “Classe Alta”, “Classe Média
Alta”, “Classe Média”, “Classe
Média Baixa”, “Nova Classe
Média”, “Classe Trabalhadora”,
“Classe Baixa”, and “Pobre”,
and the second the five Classe
A to Classe E categories.

7 | Movimento Ambientalista/
Verde, Movimento Brasil
Livre, Movimento Feminista,
Movimento Estudantil,
Movimento Evangélico,
Movimento Gay/LGBTQ,
Movimento Negro, Movimento
Passe Livre, Movimento Sem
Terra, Movimento Vem pra Rua,
Movimentos de Familiares de
Vitimas da Violência do Estado,
Movimento de Moradia, and
the Movimento de Favela.
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sympathized with.” And reflecting a growing public discourse on corruption during
this period, when asked to identify, from a list of 15 potential problems8, the three
most critical issues faced in Brazil, 45.9% of respondents identified corruption as
the most critical problem, followed distantly by unemployment at 14.9% and public
security and violence at 7.2%.
An interesting window into understanding the 2018 president election results
is the 2014 presidential runoff between Dilma Rousseff and the center-right candidate Aécio Neves. Our sample voted 37.8% for Rousseff and 21.6% for Neves9, with
support for Rousseff highest in Grajaú at 51%, and in the low to mid-30% range in
the other three neighborhoods (p = .056). Reflecting the alienation from institutionalized politics described above, a staggering 40.6% of respondents reporting either
a null vote (15.9%) or not voting (24.7%). Statistically significant differences in 2014
presidential election voting included:

8

8 | The 15 issues were
corruption, economic
growth, unemployment,
inequality between men and
women, social inequality,
homophobia, inflation, the
environment/ecology, urban
mobility, social welfare, the
quality of education, the
quality of the health system,
racism, public security and
violence, and poverty.
9 | In terms of valid votes (i.e.,
not counting null and blank
ballots), Rousseff defeated
Neves 63.6% to 36.4%.

▶▶ education level (p = .002), with high school graduates reporting more null
votes/not voting than non-high school graduates (44.1 v. 37.2%);
▶▶ age (p = .000), with voters under 30 years old reporting more null votes/not
voting (65.0% v. 31.5%) and less support for Rousseff (20.0% v. 44.4%) than
voters over 30 years old;
▶▶ race/color (p = .009), with Black respondents reporting higher levels of support for Rousseff (48.5% Rousseff to 11.7% Neves) compared to whites (31.9%
Rousseff v. 27.6% Neves) and pardas (35.4% Rousseff to 24.1% Neves); and
▶▶ self-identified “lower middle class” status (p = .051), with respondents having
higher support for Neves (30.0% to 20.4%) and null/not voting rates (48.0% v.
39.5%) than those who did not self-identify as “lower middle class”.
There were no significant differences in voting patterns based on gender, religious
affiliation, or income.
Our data further suggest that political subjectivities in the Zona Sul are heterogenous, at times internally contradictory, and not readily reducible to overarching
political identities (conservative, Petista10, feminist, leftist, Black, evangelical, etc.).
Particularly salient for grounding our discussions of intersectional activists in our ethnographic vignettes are the observed differences in social and political attitudes based
on age and race. For example, respondents under 30 years old expressed more meritocratic attitudes than their older counterparts, including being less likely to attribute
success to one’s race (3.49 v. 3.84; 1 = not at all and 5 = a lot, p = .026) or being born into
a family with good connections (2.69 v. 3.18, p= .004). Young respondents were also
more likely to believe same sex marriage should be permitted (3.58 v. 2.96; 1 = strongly
disagree and 5 = strongly agree, p = .01), and less likely to agree with the idea that a
woman should follow the will of her father (1.70 v. 2.14, p = .004). Black respondents, in
Rev. antropol. (São Paulo, Online) | v. 63 n. 2: e160722 | USP, 2020
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turn, reported more favorable assessments (either 4 = good or 5 = very good on a 1 to 5
Likert scale) than their white or parda counterparts for the feminist movement (42.3%
v. 19.6% of whites and 19.0% of pardas, p = .003), the student movement (54.1% v. 31.8%
of whites and 34.4% of pardas, p = .000); the Black movement (53.3% v. 22.4% of whites
and 33.1% of pardas, p = .000), the state violence victims movements (44.2% v. 23.4% of
whites and 27.3% of pardas, p = .000), the housing movement (39.2% v. 27.3% of whites
and 22.1 of pardas, p = .024), and the favela movement (34.8% v. 18.2% of whites and
16.9% of pardas, p = .025). How everyday experiences of race and age shape political
subjectivities and practice is a central theme we explore in the remainder of this article.
three windows into political subjectivities
and moral grammars in the zona sul
Having provided a quantitative snapshot of voting patterns and sociopolitical attitudes in our four project neighborhoods, we now present three sets of auto-ethnographic inflected vignettes (one by each of the article co-authors) to provide a more
nuanced understanding of how political subjectivities play out in everyday life, electoral politics, and community-based political engagement. These narratives combine
data from participant observation, in-depth interviews, and our three distinct experiences of living and working in the Zona Sul. Uniting these narratives is a focus on how
contested moralities and intersectional identities shape individual subjectivities and
urban periphery sociopolitical landscapes, processes of productive tension which we
believe offer insights into the 2018 election and Brazilians politics today.
Politics in Motion (Klein)
During the past five years, I have made nearly 100 Uber trips within São Paulo’s Zona
Sul. As a male North American and anthropologist to boot, I nearly always chat with the
Uberistas. Sometimes the dialogue begins when the driver hears my gringo accented
“bom dia, tudo bem?” (good morning, how are you?) and says “you’re not from here, are
you?” I answer “I am from the US – where you do live?” Most respond the Zona Sul, and
often one of our Project MOVI neighborhoods. From here we usually move into free-flowing explorations of why I am in the Zona Sul and a series of US versus Brazil comparisons
on foods, prices, work opportunities, traffic/infrastructure, and, of course, politics.
During my trips to São Paulo in July-September 2018 and February-March 2019,
I increasingly adopted a devil’s advocate style to delve more deeply into drivers’ – and
by extension – working class periphery residents’ – diverse political subjectivities. So,
in response to the litany on how “Brazilians do not understand politics,” I question
“Who are these Brazilians? Nearly everyone I talk to says the same thing but does not
consider themselves to be politically ignorant.” When I hear the “PT is corrupt and
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destroyed the country,” I ask “more so than other parties? Might the PT have done
something good for Brazil as well?” And when drivers voice the classic “Brazil could
be the richest/best country in the world,” I ask “Why isn’t it? What do you think might
be done to change the current situation?”
I will now highlight two conversations I had with Uber drivers in August 2018
to provide a glimpse into some of the prevalent sociopolitical attitudes in the Zona
Sul during the first-round presidential campaign. The first one was a 40-minute ride
from Campo Limpo to the Universidade de São Paulo (University of Sao Paulo) with
Daniel, a 30-some, white male driver. He explained to me that he had always supported the PT, but now did not support anyone or any political party. Daniel continued, “Lula, with his background as a common man/laborer, could have taken Brazil
to the next level. But he became corrupt. And how could he be president from jail?” I
questioned how he would vote in the coming election, and he said “most likely branco
(blank),but I can’t be sure until I study the candidates more closely.” I asked what he
thought of Bolsonaro, and he said “I don’t like rigid candidates.” We then spent the
second half of the ride talking about a Brazilian friend of his who lives in Portugal. I
learned that Daniel works as an Uber driver part-time, in addition to his full-time job
at a multinational food company to save money (his goal is R$ 30,000) to support his
dream of making a new life in Europe.
My conversation with Daniel echoes our 2016 household survey and 2017
in-depth interview data: low levels of current support for the PT, if sometimes an
enduring yet complicated fondness for Lula; a profound disenchantment with institutional politics; and morally grounded assessments of the precarious state of Brazilian
society. In July-August 2018, I began to observe another constellation of political subjectivity that was absent – or at least less clearly articulated – in our earlier research,
namely, the framing of Bolsonaro as a morally sound agent of change. This narrative is
typified by a ride I took just a few days before my chat with Daniel. My driver, Rodrigo,
was a pardo male in his early 30s who lived in Pernambuco and Paraná before settling
in São Paulo. He started our conversation by asking me what I thought about the
coming election, and I said “well, it looks like Lula will be in jail and not able to run,
and Bolsonaro has support, but I’m not sure if he has enough to win.” In response, he
aggressively critiqued IBOPE11 (a well-respected national polling organization) and
election polls more generally, saying “How do they know this? They never talk to me
or anyone I know!” I countered with the need for sampling in a metropolitan area of
20 million people, but he simply turned his head and rolled his eyes. I then asked if he
supported Bolsonaro, and he said “yes” with the following explanation.
“This country is a mess and needs order. We need to clean things up. Today you can do anything
without any consequences. … Things that need to be changed. Like gay marriage. I have nothing
against gay people, but this can’t be (não pode) – it’s not right – marriage is for the family, children.
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And sex education – I have a six-year-old, and in school they say “penis” – this can’t be. And gun control
(desarmamento) – this is wrong – if you take a class you should be able to have a gun.”
(Rodrigo, mixed race male, Uber driver, early 30s )

To sum things up, he concluded, “Brazil is not the problem; it is strong. The problem is Brazilians.”
Coming back to post-election Brazil in February 2019, I encountered more
outspoken Bolsonaro supporters, though none as strident as Rodrigo. I found that
pro-Bolsonaro and anti-PT sentiment were intricately and unstably interlinked. This
shifting landscape of political subjectivities can be seen in the Alves family, who I
know well from our Project MOVI research. As was common during the election,
several members of the family stopped speaking to each other after disagreeing
about Bolsonaro, and in particular, his racist, sexist and homophobic comments. But
post-election, the rifts seemed submerged, if not exactly healed.
Like many families in the periphery, the extended Alves clan includes households who range in income from Class D to lower Class B, with most in Class C, while
Henrique, an in-law, comes from a solidly traditional middleclass family. Having
interviewed four family members in August 2018 and spent considerable time with
them over the past three years, I have a general sense of their political sentiments,
which, with the exception of one progressive community activist, I would categorize as socially liberal, non-religious, apolitical, anti-Lula, and anti-PT. While none
explicitly supported Bolsonaro at the time of the interviews, Henrique offered the
following assessment of Bolsonaro and what Brazil needs:
“This Bolsonaro, he’s somebody who says too much. We need someone better, a military person,
unfortunately. They are more conservative – unfortunately, this is what we need. No one is taking care
of things, people do whatever they want. It’s like this – Brazilians need to learn, they need a spanking.
Without a spanking, they’ll never learn!” (Henrique, white male, entrepreneur, 47 years old)

Four months later I spent carnaval at Henrique’s rented beach house and had
a number of give-and-take political conversations with family members, several
of their friends, and other guests at the complex. Our topics ranged from pension
“reform” (Henrique and his 27- year-old partner Denise said they would prefer “private investments and retirement plans” to the current governmental system), the
January 2019 dam collapse tragedy in Brumadinho, Minas Gerais (Denise’s mother
said that the firm behind the tragedy and the federal government’s responses were
shameful, and we all agreed), and the challenges of being a small businessperson in
Brazil. On this last point, the hosts and their entrepreneur friends used a meritocratic discourse to describe their experiences in a business environment that they see
as combining excessive taxation, regulatory obstacles, and employees who do not
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want to work (“We pay above market wages, yet they do not have a work ethic and
describe their work as slavery”). Their identity as morally grounded, hardworking
businesspeople is not, however, framed in terms of the traditional gender/sexual
politics advocated by Bolsonaro supporters such as my Uber driver Rodrigo. Instead,
Denise and Henrique see Bolsonaro as someone who may be able to set Brazil on
a better economic course, and who, perhaps most importantly, affirms their status
as self-sufficient entrepreneurs who create wealth and jobs. In this moral grammar,
the PT functions as a free-floating signifier of the dangers of corruption and social
programs (e.g. the Bolsa Família12) that discourage people from valuing work. And in
the end, disrespects hard workers such as themselves.
Window 2: Politics on the Margins (Carmo)

12

12 | The Bolsa Família (Family
Grant) is a federal social
welfare program that provides
financial aid to low income
families on the condition
that their children attend
school and are vaccinated.

[In the past] I respected, I liked, and always voted for the PT. My father is a steelworker, a trade
unionist. He always supported and voted for Lula, and I always voted for Lula. I wasn’t really conscious
of what I was doing – he voted for Lula and I voted for Lula. During his re-election, I didn’t vote for Lula
– I voided my vote because I was already beginning to be disenchanted [with the PT], but I voted for
Dilma in her second term. So, you see, the PT was a party I consistently voted for. And then the party
began to splinter, and there were new parties on the left, and I voted for them. (….). Now I don’t vote
for anyone! I’ve decided if it has to be Lula, or whatever, Bolsonaro, only to save my neck would I vote
for Lula. But I don’t want to vote for the least bad. Because in the past few elections I have voted for the
least bad, and this made me feel awful. (Paula, Afro-Brazilian, 38 years old, July 2017 interview).

Paula has lived in Grajaú her entire life. Like many São Paulo periphery youth, she began
working as an adolescent (in her case, at 15), first for several large corporations based
in the downtown region, and then switching to the public/non-profit social service
sector. Since 2010, she has worked as an educadora social13 for a governmental child and
youth service agency. At the time of this interview, Paula had recently discontinued her
college studies in the sociology program at a for-profit private university because she
could not afford the monthly tuition bill. She is also the mother of a teenage daughter
and a founding member of a Zona Sul cultural activist group whose work has focused
on the interconnections between gender, race, sexuality and periphery subjectivities.
Paula’s life path is similar to many activists I have worked with since arriving in
the Zona Sul in 2011: studying in the public education system for elementary, middle
and high school, but enrolling in for-profit, private institutions for college; entering
the work force at a young age; being parents of non-adult children; having professional trajectories in non-governmental organizations and governmental social programs; and participating in periphery-based cultural/political groups, in particular,
the many collectives (coletivos) that have multiplied rapidly in São Paulo’s peripheries
in the past decade. Paula connects her activism to the unconscious influence of her
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trade unionist father when she was a child. As a large social science literature has
documented, a key feature of the emerging participatory democracy in Brazil’s urban
peripheries during the 1970s and 1980s in the post-dictatorship abertura (opening)
was an interconnection between leftist political parties, labor unions, and social
movements (Dagnino, 1994; Kowarick, 2009). However, over the course of the 1990s
and 2000s, many social movements gradually lost their role of militant revindication
and instead became incorporated within the state bureaucracy as providers of social
programs (Carmo, 2017; Feltran, 2011). Paula and her family are part of these historical
processes, although their political trajectories differ – while her father’s generation
of metalworkers were labor union and PT militants, Paula has experimented with
other forms of political engagements that have few if any connections to the PT or
other political parties and are characterized by an underlying distrust of conventional
political discourse and structures. Most of these collectives are made up of youth and
young adults and organize around everyday experiences of intersectionalities, with
particular emphasis on denouncing inequalities and state violence.
If Paula and many other collective activists gradually became disillusioned with
the PT and created news forms of political engagement, it is important to recognize
that some Zona Sul residents (13% of respondents in our 2016 survey) continue to identity with the PT and recognize its role in supporting the economic and social advances
of urban periphery communities. As Capão Redondo resident Danilo explained to me,
during the time of the PT governance, “people in the periphery had a little more space,
a little more awareness.” Cynthia, from Capão Redondo, further observes that the PT
“gave a little more dignity to the poor.” Such appreciation of the PT is less commonly
voiced by collective activists, whose political narrative often positions the PT, as representatives of the State, as promoting the genocide of the poor Blacks in the periphery
and defending party and state interests over the necessities of periphery residents.
My own personal and professional trajectory in the Zona Sul has provided
me the opportunity to observe these transformations firsthand. In 2011, I began
working in a longstanding non-governmental organization that develops social
projects linked to the human rights of children and youth. In this work, I have accompanied the development of the new forms of political subjectivities, discourses
and practices that Paula describes and that were common among many youth and
young adult activists I encountered. A key moment in these sociopolitical transformations was the period from 2013 to 2016, when a wave of collectives centered on
intersectional identities emerged, including, among many others, Fala Guerreira
(Speak Women Warriors!) (Projeto Fala Guerreira!, 2017), Periferia Segue Sangrando
(Periphery Continues to Bleed) (Periferia Segue Sangrando, n.d.), and Tamo Vivo (We
Are Alive) (Tamo Vivo, n.d.). This blossoming of collectives coincided – and tensely
coexisted – with the administration of then São Paulo mayor Fernando Haddad. One
of Haddad’s key periphery-directed policies in this period was the Plano Juventude
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Viva (Youth Alive Plan)14, which focused on ending the killing of youth at a time when
youth homicides rates were rapidly rising. These tensions were vividly displayed at
planning meetings, public hearings, and project-related events, such as the program
inauguration at the CEU16 Casa Blanca in 2013, which included the participation of
Haddad and the representatives of many city departments. At the conclusion of
the official opening comments, youth from the Tamo Vivo (We are Alive) collective
climbed onto the stage, seized the microphone, and recited this poem.
Está quase na hora de partir

It’s almost time to leave

Caminho com passos rápidos

I walk fast

Mas cautelosos, né?

But cautiously, right?

Periferia, você sabe

Peripehry, you know

Não se pode vacilar

You can’t vacillate

A chuva fina que cai do céu

The light rain falls from the sky

O vento frio que bate no meu rosto

The cold wind hits my face

Com eles veem a notícia

With them comes the news

Que já foram quatro mortos pela polícia

That four were already killed by the police

Uns dizem

Some say

Estava na hora errada, no lugar errado

They were in the wrong place at the wrong time

Outros dizem

Others say

Foi o motoqueiro fantasma, mano

It was the ghost biker, brother

Mas a certeza é

But the certainty is

Mais um nas estatísticas

One more statistic

Mais um arquivo fechado

One more closed case

Mais um preto morto

One more Black man dead

Nessa porra dessa ditadura

In this fucked-up dictatorship

Nós aqui, ó

We are here, look

Somos apenas sobreviventes

We are only survivors

Do campo de extermínio, tá ligado?

From the concentration camp, are you listening?

This daring act not only destabilized formal meeting protocols, but its highlighting
the gap between “reality” and the suffering caused by so many murders resulted in a
combination of euphoria and discomfort, particularly since the youth was the “target
population” of the program. This display of antagonism between the new collectives
and the PT stands in stark contrast to the PT’s relationship with social movements in
the 1970s and 1980s, when the PT was generally seen as representing popular class
interests and aspirations, and demonstrates the shifting political landscape of Zona
Sul political activism during the 2010s.
In making sense of these political transformations and their possible connection to the election of Bolsonaro, it is important to stress that the collective’s
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self-conscious positioning outside of institutional politics and state-led initiatives is
not grounded within an anti-corruption discourse, but in their everyday experiences
with police violence and the representatives of political parties who administer public policies such as the Plano Juventude Viva. What I seek to highlight here is that the
positioning of activists who support the goals of similar collectives and grassroots
organizations does not represent political alienation. On the contrary, these activists
dedicate themselves to political engagement at the level of everyday life and create
spaces, discourses and practices that help make sense of a social world profoundly
shaped by social inequality, racism, and gender and police violence. Through their
political engagements, these activists are not only producing themselves as subjects
(Butler, 1997), but are also forging new life possibilities and paths of resistance. These
intersectional moralities are based on markers of social difference such as race,
gender, sexuality and class (Moutinho, 2012). These categories produce intervals in
everyday life, which themselves are reiterated or transformed through these everyday interactions. As a result, examining how politics is (re)produced in the fluxes
of everyday life is fundamental to understanding the broader Brazilian political
landscape (Feltran, 2017). For example, when collectives place the responsibility
for the death of youth on the State and characterize these killings as genocide, they
question the idea that “a good criminal is a dead criminal” (bandido bom é bandido
morto) as well the naturalization of police violence and punitive law enforcement,
corrections and legal systems. Certainly these discourses are most strongly articulated within activist circles, but they also reverberate in neighborhoods through public
events such as youth-focused, anti-violence/anti-genocide events throughout the
Zona Sul and the Cia Humbalada of Teatro’s Grajaú Vem Tomar no Copo carnaval
bloco (Klein, 2019) in which Paula participates. And besides such structured events,
intersectional activist moralities tensely circulate and impact activists’ extended
family networks, which are themselves microcosms of the racial, religious, political
and moral diversities of the Zona Sul. As a result, although collective-based activists
may position themselves outside of – and often, against – the State and institutional
politics (including that of the left), in their everyday lives they spread progressive
viewpoints well beyond the confines of activist collectives, and in the process, explicitly challenge the growing wave of conservative moralities and politics within their
families and neighborhoods.
Window 3: Politics in Everyday Life (Tavares)
In the month before the election, I overheard arguments everywhere – on the bus, at
bars and cafes, on the streets – any place where people come together in São Paulo’s
urban peripheries. The disputes involved a hardening of social difference – on one
side, a conservative, moral rejuvenation political project centered on customs, life
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styles and new subjectivities that need to be controlled, and on the other side, a defense of the PT’s project of economic development and expansion of individual and
social rights. In these conversations, PT supporters called Haddad “my professor” and
invoked the rational language of statistics and public policy to argue for the continuation of PT programs, a dramatic shift from the impassioned and inspiring rhetoric
of Lula’s 2002 presidential campaign. In contrast, Bolsonaro supporters presented
themselves as agents of change and emotionally called for cleaning the political
house and defending conservative social morays and the “family.” And rather than
engage in public policy discussions with Haddad supporters, most Bolsonaristas
simply dismissed all PT candidates as corrupt petralhas.
These debates extended into the world of social media, and in Jardim
Nakamura, one of our Project MOVI neighborhoods, I observed many of these exchanges firsthand. A neighbor would open her Facebook and share the gossip for
everyone – “You know that Fabricio is going to vote for Bolsonaro!” Everyone around
her would stretch their necks to see the screen and, in disbelief, read a post defending
Bolsonaro’s call for the right of Brazilians to bear arms. A comment ironically countered “you’ll be able to spend R$5,000 on a gun to defend your J6 (an inexpensive
cellular phone)”, generating online guffaw emojis and physical laughs from some of
the gathered neighbors.
Through such humor-laced interactions, the streets of the Zona Sul experienced a level of political agitation not seen since the candidacy of Paulo Maluf in
1993 and the ongoing political disputes surrounding him during the 1990s. These
arguments were often tense, with Bolsonaro supporters speaking in hushed voices,
as they saw themselves as being in a threatening territory that historically belonged
to the PT, but whose predominance had waned over the years due to a combination
of disappointment about Brazil’s overall political situation and a gradual decline in
support for the party from local community activists. These transformations in the
political landscape intensified after the election of Dilma Rousseff, and it was in this
context, just two days before the election, that I observed the following interaction.
Scene 1
It was a late afternoon in Jardim Ibirapuera, and two young Black women were
smoking a joint and chatting in an alleyway staircase. One of them, Ana, had straight
hair, and the other one, Eluiza, had curly hair in a Black power style, a detail that
will become pertinent as the scene evolves. They suddenly heard a voice of an older
women, and after a few moments, realized that she was talking to or –- more likely
— at them. But they did not understand exactly what she was saying, and so, to keep
safe and be polite, they put out the joint. And then they understood what she was
saying: “What horrible hair. You need to take care of it. How can you go out with hair
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like that! It could only be someone like that.”
Both were totally embarrassed, and Ana turned toward Eluiza, whose Black
power hair was the subject of the older women’s outburst, and they tried to find
some way to communicate to her through their eyes and silence. But she did not get
the message and continued to weave her barrage of swearing and critiques of Black
power hair. Walking past Ana, the older woman continued,
“You need to talk to your friend and take care of this hair. You can’t be on the street with hair like that.
Hair like that doesn’t belong on the streets. She looks like she is one of those women with armpit hair.
God forbid - that kind votes for the PT!”

And with this final pronouncement, she descended the staircase.
Later that day, I was sitting with Ana and Eluiza at a nearby neighborhood
bar, and we reflected on what had happened. I asked, “But what did you do?” and
Ana responded,
“Nothing. We just watched, paralyzed, without understanding any of it. But, reflecting on what
happened, I think I wouldn’t have wanted to say anything. This woman was also Black. What could I say
to her? And she had the same hair too!” [and which she denies through the use of hair products].

It is not possible to make sense of this scene without examining the moral grammar
that underlies the reactions of both the two young women and the older women.
In reflecting on the production of difference and inequality, Moutinho asks us to
consider the mechanisms of power that generate differences between an “us” and a
”them’”(Moutinho, 2014). Seen in this light, the older Black woman’s reaction to Black
power hair demonstrates her understanding of feminist movements and politics at
the same time it constructs a “them” in opposition to proper people such as herself.
On the other hand, what moral regime(s) and mechanisms of power underlie that
reaction of the youth women? Here, we can observe the influence of a growing
Zona Sul feminist movement centered on questions of class, race and sisterhood.
This movement asserts that even in the face of public discrimination, an “us” can
be preserved, one that offers empathy and that opens a crack between the “we”
constructed through activism and the “we” of the violent, ambiguous and conflictive
world of everyday life.
Scene 2
The interaction presented in Scene One reminds me of an experience that occurred
during our Project MOVI fieldwork in Grajaú. We were looking at our map to decide where to begin implementing our survey. We were three blocks from the train
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station, surrounded by some houses that suggested higher economic status, and
others of a more popular class profile. In the language of our research, these were
Class C and D families. On that day, seven members of the Projeto MOVI team were
in the field. Most of us were Black women, along with one young Black gay man. We
all presented ourselves corporeally and aesthetically through popular class cultural
motifs, and as we often discussed among ourselves without reaching a resolution,
we wondered if our social backgrounds and appearances might affect the responses
and/or behavior of the interviewees. The scene that I will recount here involves a
situation when one of our researcher’s sexuality became evident during survey
administration. Of course, sexuality does not always have an obvious corporeal expression, but in this case, Jonas’ sexuality was readily evident, as our team member
is markedly “effeminate” in his gestures and speech – in popular language, he is a
queen (bicha afetada).
On this particular afternoon, Jonas walked toward the first house on our map
to see if the resident was interested in participating in our survey. The potential interviewee, an approximately 20-year-old Afro-descendant man, agreed, and a lively
and spontaneous conservation began, one with moments of relaxation and affinity,
as often happened during our research in all four neighborhoods. As described above,
our survey addressed many different levels and dimensions of our respondents’ lives,
including polemic issues, such as whether they support gay marriage. In response to
this question, the interviewee stopped smiling and responded, “I totally disagree.
Nothing against you, brother. Everyone can do what they want. But marriage, no, I
am against it. But I don’t have anything against you.” The interview then continued
along a similar pattern, generally friendly yet with abrupt moments of awkwardness
in which their connection became strained.
When we got together at the end of the day and processed our experiences,
we talked about how this interviewee supported the legalization of marijuana, was
against male chauvinism, and generally gave very liberal responses to our social
attitude questions. Yet, at the same time, he was staunchly against gay marriage
and seemed uncomfortable positioning himself alongside another person who was
obviously affected by what he thought, although the interviewee did not see his
response as constituting any form of discrimination.
In this example, we see how the production of difference in everyday life
is connected to mechanisms of power that are themselves continuously in play. To
begin with, the interaction of the two men is marked by a shared cultural repertoire
and affinities across many domains. The asking and responding to the gay marriage question touches on the difference between “us” that had not fully unfolded
until this moment, and produces a “them.” That is, in saying “I don’t have anything
against you, but I am against gay marriage”, the interviewee is trying to differentiate
between the legitimization of violence and the denial of rights. The fact that he is
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against the social legitimacy of homoaffective relations is not, in his eyes, connected
to legitimizing homophobic violence. He also indirectly affirms this distinction by
his very agreeing to participate in a survey on such controversial topics and generally
behaving in a friendly manner. Yet, his denial of the rights of LGBTQI+ communities
is itself a form of homophobic violence, not lethal, but nonetheless, very blunt.
Final Thoughts
In these everyday disputes on the eve of the second-round voting, we can observe
how the 2018 elections drew attention to the supposed dangers posed by youth
whose behavioral patterns are popularly described as “having lost respect” (perderam
o respeito). This concept brings together a wide range of “morally questionable” activities, including cell phone theft, indiscriminate marijuana use, public expression
of lesbian and homoaffective relationships, women showing their breasts during
carnival, the growth of trans and travesti identities, new Black aesthetics, feminist
political action through posters and public interventions, and above all, new forms
of sociability and the negotiation of public space in urban periphery neighborhoods.
The growth of support for Bolsonaro is further interconnected with mechanisms of
power that react to these new political postures, actors and subjectivities that make
the private public and dispute the moral grammar of everyday life. Or, as the older
Black woman from Scene One affirms, “there is no place for hair like that.”
Anthropologists have consistently demonstrated how humor can function
as both a social gesture and a politics of subversion (among others, Douglas, 1977;
Goldstein 2003; Pettegrew, 2017). In the context of the politics of everyday life, laughter offers a mechanism for reflecting, critiquing and contesting not only articulated
beliefs and disbeliefs, but also the empty spaces alongside them. As my ethnographic vignettes reveal, the 2018 election unfolded like a sports rivalry in which conversation flowed through jeers, off-color language, and jokes, with humor the thread
that enabled the two sides to position themselves within the conflict, and in many
cases, avoid more extreme forms of confrontation. I conclude this section by offering
two vignettes that highlight how Zona Sul activists use humor as a way to navigate
and challenge ongoing experiences of intersectionalities in the context of an always
shifting political landscape.
Scene 3
It was almost election day. We were seated outside at a bar, four women having a
beer and sharing our disbelief at how the election might play out. Bete suggested
that the election was like an abusive relationship, and we all started laughing. She
continued, “he always says he is going to change, be different, and you believe it, but
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the same violent patterns continue. You have a sense of inferiority and that’s how it
goes.” We all laughed, and Vera concluded her thought, “Then you isolate yourself
from family and close friends.” And we laughed even louder, as only laughter made
clear what before had seemed inexplicable.
Scene 4
More recently, I was with a group of women talking about the abusive relationship
of a friend of ours, and we were finding it hard to believe what was happening.
Fernanda Gomes, a lesbian activist from the Zona Sul, began to laugh and said, “You
all talk about these boys the same what you talk about the PT.‘I believed in you, but
you did this? You disappointed me, but I continued to believe in you.’” Laughter took
over the room as we recounted our many disappointments with men and the PT.
Here is it important to emphasize that while many middle-class Brazilian intellectual continue to strongly defend the PT and social and economic advances that occurred during PT governance, which are uncontestable facts; for activists in the Zona
Sul periphery, these advances simultaneously bring up a series of disappointments
and negotiations. Among the most vivid is the 2012 image of Lula shaking hands
with Paulo Maluf, an ongoing symbol of military repression and corruption among
community activists in the Zona Sul peripheries.
conclusion – living in the (post)-bolsonaro world
In this article we have highlighted some of the diverse and multifaceted political
subjectivities of residents of São Paulo’s Zona Sul with the goal of providing insights
into the current political scenario in Brazil. Rather than assuming that individuals
are simply victims or pawns of large structural forces (e.g., Globo, WhatsApp, consumerism, a well-orchestrated anti-PT movement), we argue that Zona Sul residents
have unfinished – and at times internally contradictory – political subjectivities that
do not reduce to left/right, pro-PT/pro-Bolsonaro, or pro-PT/anti-PT political identities. Instead, we argue that for many Zona Sul residents, political subjectivities are
morally, rather than ideologically, grounded and (re)created through everyday experiences of intersectionalities. These processes can be seen in the lives and political
activism of Paula and other collective members who continue to seek new paths of
resistance in an increasingly hostile and unsettled political environment. Similarly,
Rodrigo, the pro-Bolsonaro Uber driver, is also constructing a new moral grammar
and life path, one in which, if we take his words at face value, he “has nothing against
gays” yet supports the reassertion of “traditional” moral values. Of course, as Tavares
argues in her analysis, such attitudes express a latent homophobia. But perhaps
Rodrigo is less homophobic than interested in affirming his own moral worth, which
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he defines partly in terms of conservative social morality yet also, perhaps, in terms
of being able to support his family in the manner he would like, a possibility that has
become increasingly difficult during an extended recession. At the same time, many
Bolsonaro supporters we have talked to, including the Alvez family and the extended
familial networks of Carmo and Tavares, like that Bolsonaro says “outrageous” things,
but may not think that he will actually follow through on making them a reality.
In attempting to understand the complex political subjectivities of individuals across the ideological spectrum, we do not mean to minimize these dangers
posed by the Bolsonaro presidency and the implementation of his policy agenda.
Quite the contrary. Instead, we seek to expose zones of friction (Tsing, 2011) that
might be conducive to progressive social change and counter a common feeling
that we have encountered in our fieldwork, namely that “there is no more ‘us’”
(não têm mais nós). We believe the examples of the everyday construction of “us”
and “them” we have described are examples of such zones of friction, operating on
many difference scales and raising many questions. For example, is the older Black
woman who finds Black power hair abhorrent part of the “us” of Black women
from the periphery (i.e., mulheres negras periféricas) articulated by Black feminist
collectives, in that she has a similar class background, gender and race as collective activists? Or who exactly in the “us” of periphery-based Black movements,
one of whose key calls to action is “we are all Black” (somos todos negros), when our
quantitative data suggests that many Afro-descendant Brazilians who self-identity as parda have markedly different political attitudes and social positioning than
those who self-identity as preta. And what of Rodrigo and our survey respondent’s
invocation of “I have nothing against gays”, which would seem to include gays in
the grand “us” of informal sociability, but deny gays the right to the legal recognition of their relationships and confine the expression of homoaffectivity to the
confines of the home in order to not offend family morality. And this in a country
where more than 40 million children live in female-headed households without a
present father (Carasco, 2018).
It is important to note that our survey, interviews, and most of our field work
occurred before the election of Bolsonaro. Since then, markedly political polarization
continues, particularly over differing views on what roles the State should take in
enforcing certain conceptions of morality, guaranteeing civil and human rights, and
addressing the social needs of vulnerable individuals and communities. Exactly how
the collectives we have presented in this article will respond to the challenges posed
by the Bolsonaro administration and neo-populist conservatism is still evolving. One
change we observed in the first months of the Bolsonaro era is a growing willingness
on the part of some collective activists to work within certain sectors of the State from
an explicitly oppositional positioning. For example, a member of a Zona Sul feminist
collective became a staff person for a São Paulo state representative who is a trans
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Black women, while Monica Seixas was elected a São Paulo state representative as
the official candidate for a nine-person group of collective activists.
And who would have predicated the arrival of COVID-19 in São Paulo in
February 2020? In thinking about contemporary social movements and political organizing in the Zona Sul during this terrifying conjecture, we believe capoeira offers
an excellent metaphor. Over the past 18 months, many collectives have slowed their
activities and taken the time to reflect on the cultural and political interventions
they might make in a still shifting political landscape, and many groups have disarticulated as a result of internal conflict. The return, the silence, the step behind – capoeira
helps us see that this pause may offer greater understanding of the current situation, a better entry point, a step back before a counter strike. The waiting and silence
of the capoeirista does not signify giving up, but on the contrary, but the pursuit of
the wisdom needed to continue the fight.
As São Paulo experiences the ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic, we now see
that rather than organizing around the experiences of intersectionalities and state
violence, a majority of collective activists are now organizing around distributing
basic necessities, such as food, gas, and economic resources, for periphery families
who are losing their jobs or unable to work. Many of these families were already
socially vulnerable before the arrival of COVID-19, and their precarity is further aggravated by the pandemic. Yet, laughter accompanies this shared social catastrophe.
As a Zona Sul activist comments to one of us, “I have never eaten so well as at this
time of the pandemic. They send us the donations they receive from closed stores.
Who would have imagined that we would now have highest quality diapers and
chocolates!” And everyone laughed.
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